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In colloquial language and everyday life people generally assume that objects
and people have a permanent identity over time. This is consequentially
important as social institutions including but not limited to contracts,
criminal justice, recognition of achievements, etc., expect that a person may
be held responsible and accountable for their actions, and may be attributed
for their accomplishments. Thus, consequentially speaking, normal functioning
of society expect and assume an enduring identity for their proper functioning.
The mere necessity of an enduring identity does not justify its ontological
correctness, however. This essay seeks to explore the diachronic problem of
personal identity through the perspectives of <++>.
The most obvious criteria for personal identity is the physical human body’s
preservation. While most cells do regenerate throughout the life of a human
being, Carbon-14 dating has identified that occipital neurons persist
throughout a human’s life [1]. We may therefore pseudo-formally define the body
criteria of identity endurance with essential cells that stay consistent
throughout a person’s life.
For the sake of completeness in case provisional science turns out to be
incorrect, let us consider the possibility where all of our cells are in fact
replaced, such as in the classic example of the Ship of Theseus where parts of
the ship are constantly replaced until no original parts remain.
Biological and physical theories of personal identity, or otherwise that of a
collective object, that base the status of identity on the identity of its
constituent parts, assume enduring identity of their individual constituent
parts. Although there is a realistically plausible notion of one cell staying
as the same cell throughout time, and perhaps a notion of molecules and atoms
staying the same throughout time, this logic would be hard to apply to
individual subatomic particles.
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