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* {config,index}.go, cca.scfg.example, style.css, *.html: Link to sourceRunxi Yu5 days1-0/+3
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* *: Change license to AGPL-3.0-or-laterRunxi Yu5 days1-21/+11
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* auth.go, config.go, cca.scfg.example: Issue expiring cookiesRunxi Yu5 days1-0/+3
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* ws.go, config.go, config.scfg.example: Attempt to fix deadlockRunxi Yu6 days1-0/+3
| | | | | | | When propagate tries to propagate a message to a connection that actually called propagate, it deadlocks because the it tries to send to that connection's send channel in the same goroutine. This is an attempt at a fix.
* courses.go, etc: Make courses a map instead of a sliceRunxi Yu8 days1-3/+0
| | | | | We need to refer to courses by their ID, and a map makes significantly more sense than a slice.
* *.go, cca.scfg.example: Expose performance optionsRunxi Yu9 days1-0/+16
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* *.go: Wrap errorsRunxi Yu9 days1-2/+3
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* *.go: LintingRunxi Yu11 days1-7/+7
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* *.go: Add commentsRunxi Yu2024-09-091-4/+8
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* *: Call Graph API for department informationRunxi Yu2024-09-071-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | I am using a hybrid flow with "id_token" for OpenID Connect and "code" for an Authorization Code. I would use "token" too but that doesn't seem to be supported for standard web-apps and could result in strange session-hijacking issues. We still need PKCE sometime in the future; however it's not a priority: the worst attack someone could pull off is to use a different user's Authorization Code and steal a Department, which probably isn't too big of a deal as the Authorization Code should be secret anyways.
* *: Basic authentication and templatesRunxi Yu2024-09-071-0/+111
These are imported from FBFP and slightly modified to be specific to YKPS (while not being hard to port to other environments that use APIs that use OAUTH 2.0). Some code is also simplified. Database code still needs an audit, and things are not tested yet.